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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Conceptions of personal responsibility detennine both the existence of
human laws and the impositions of sanctions for transgressions.

Such

attributions of responsibility would seem to require impartiality on the part
of the judges.

Given a group of individuals asked to determine the respon-

sibility of a person for a certain action, one would like to determine both
the presence and the degree of aey subjective biases entering into such a
judgment.
Attribution theory concerns the process by which an individual
interprets events 11 as being caused by particular parts of the relatively
stable enviromnent 11 (Heider, 1958, p.

in the environment.

297).

Attribution refers to the

Kelley's (1967) interpretation says that attribution of

behavior t.o one or another causal source (one's self or the environment,
personal idiosyncracies or the objective requirements of the situation, and
the like) will often require social comparisons.

To be able to tell whether

one's judgments, beliefs, or opinions are objectively right, it may be
necessary to compare one 1s beliefs with the beliefs of others. We usually
, describe people by the acts they do.

"The perceiver seeks to find sufficient

reason why the person acted and why the act took on a particular form"
(Jones

I

&

Davis, 1965, p.

220) •

Heider points out that the attribution of

personal responsibility involves a decision as to which of the several
conditions of action--the

(-

intentio~

of a person, personal. power, or

__z_,,,..._.,._,.,_ _ _ ,..,. ___

,_~--·"'

,,,,_

2·

environmental factors--is to be given primary weight for the actual outcome.
In general, the mre enviromnental factors are thought to influence the

action, the less the person is held responsible for an action with which he
is connected.
In the case where the person is concerned with the dispositional.
properties of his surrounding enciromnent, the choice is between external
(environ.'llent) attribution and internal {self) attribution.

Kelley (1967)

holds that attribution to the external stinrulus instead of the self requires
that the individual respond differentially to the stimulus, that the same
individual responds consistently, over time and modality, and that the
individual responds in agreement with an opinion of another person's
responses to it.

The analysis of the attribution process proposed by

1965) in that both derive from Reider's work.

However, Jones and Davis

were concerned with the circumstances under which an actor is seen as the
cause of given effects, whereas Kelley was concerned with attribution to the
environment.

It can be said, however, that both theories complement each

other.
Attribution of responsibility for an accident
Attribution of responsibility for an accident is an issue that has
stimulated much recent research. Walster (1966) hypothesized that there is
a tendency to try to assign responsibility to someone when we hear about an
accident and that people attribute more responsibility when the consequences of the accident

~come

more serious.

Her data supported this

hypothesis and were interpreted in terms of defensive attribution.

a..------·----------•_,_.____
,.

,_:1.,....,.a,~~1ii;u

M!lll•

JP'l;_,_..,.,.,_t•-·--·-·-•~-•-•---·--·-~-~--...t
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According to Walster, the realization that life could be profoundly affected
by chance happenings over which one has no control is very threatening

JIK)St individuals.

to

Therefore, a perceiver attributes more responsibility to

a victim or perpetrator in a serious relative to a less serious accident to
protect himself from acknowledging the fact that he could ever be involved
in such an unfortunate event. Walster (1966) presented subjects with a
taped description of a stimulus person and the accident in which his
vehicle was involved.

In the first two condi_tions, the person's car

received either inconsequential or considerable damage when it rolled downhill after being parked on a street •. In the

~hird

condition, other people

fortuitously escaped harm and in the fourth condition these people were
seriously injured by the rolling automobile.

Both male and female subjects

assigned JIK)re responsibility to the owner when the consequences of the
accident in terms of damage to the automobile were serious rather than
minor.

Males attributed ioore responsibility to the stimulus person when

other people were actually injured than when they were only exposed to
danger;

females attributed the same degree of responsibility to the driver

of the automobile in both personal injury conditions.

Greater seriousness

of outcome did not, however, result in the subject's attributing greater
carelessness to behavior prior to the accident.

SUbjects did advocate li'X>re

rigorous safety measures when the consequences were ioore serious.
In a second paper, Walster (1967) reported two experiments in which a

stimulus person, in a taped interview, described the decision alternatives
and risks involved in a real estate purchase, the aim of which was
financial gain.

The final course of action taken by this individual and

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _•..,..... • •12• _.,..._, _ _ _ _ _ _....,._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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the actual outcome were also revealed in printed material prior to the
presentation of the taped interview.

SUbjects in these experiments expressed

m:>re confidence that they themselves would have foreseen the actual outcome
as the consequences, both negative and positive, became m:>re serious.

How-

ever, contrary to the original experiment, greater personal responsibility
was not attributed to the stimulus person as the outcomes became more
serious.

In fact, in one of' the experiments attributed responsibility

decreased with seriousness of outcome, while in the other, there was no
consistent relationship.
Severa.]. other attempts were made to replicate Walster's (1966)
original findings.

Shaver (l970a, 1970b), Shaver and Carroll (1970), Shaw

and Skolnick (1971), and Crinklaw and Vidmar (1971) have all failed to
reproduce the origin.al

£itililig1:;.

Shaver (1970a) believes that the more relevant a negative outcome, the
more a perceiver is forced to find ways of denying that he could ever be
blamed for his involvement in a similar accident.

He proposed an

alternative conceptuallzation of defensive attribution.

According to this

f'onuulation, the real discomfort experienced by the perceiver when he
confronts a serious accident is the realization that he could at some time
be

blamed by others for his involvement in a similar accident.

To protect

h.i.mself from acknowledging this possibility, a perceiver attributes less
personal responsibility to the individual involved in an accident as the
outcoma;; of a mishap become more serious.

But unfortunately his data did

the perception or justice or injustice in a situation and it is closely tied
to.the process or ascribing causality or blame for the fates of the people
inVolved.

He believes that an individual's concern with justice and

injustice may influence the way he explains to himself' the causalities of
important outcomes in his environment.

Because human beings wish to .feel

secure, most people prefer to believe tha·t others earn their misfortunes,
instead of attributing the causes to mysterious .factors beyond their control.
Pecause maI\1 times people need to feel secure in their own world they may
assign blame to someone else.

Lerner asserts that in effect people say,

"It can happen to others, but not to me.:: In a oore general manner it could
be said that people will arrange their cognitions so as to maintain the
belief that people get what they deserve, or, deserve what they get.
point. has Deen macte ey otner psychologists.

This

!''or examp.Le, tte1aer (1958) has

mted the tendency to perceive misfortune as pmti.shment:

the harm that

befalls a person is deserved and therefore ought to happen to him.

Lerner

and Sinnn.ons (1966) found support for their major hypothesis that "rejection
is the product of the observer's attempt to maintain his belief in a just
world."
The role of s:im:ilarity
Shaver (1970a) makes an analysis of the concept of "relevance" and
reveals at least two major classes of contributing factors:

those

associated with situational similarity and those associated with personal
similarity.

The first one refers to perceived similarities between the

circumstances of the stimulus person and the subject.

In contrast, the

second one which is personal similarity refers to the perceived congruence
~._..

_ _...._,.....______________

=-·-v~-·-•-m.----._..-....._,,__..-.._,___...

_ ____,.______

~.
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of beliefs, values, and personal characteristics between the stimulus person
and the subject.

Situational similarity would appear to be necessary :f'or

arousal of the self-protective tendency.

It can be illustrated by pointing

out that a crash of a military jet aircraft would be of almost no importance
to

an average female college student, but it would be quite threatening to

another military pilot.

He would feel less secure since an accident did

happen to someone similar to him.

The ac cldent was, therefore, relevant

and the pilot must make some cognitive effort to protect himself.

Once the

self-protective tendency was aroused by situational similarity, differences
in judgment might be produced by different degrees of personal. similarl ty.

If this assumption is a valid one, this may be the reason why Walster (1967)

was unable to replicate her earlier work.
exfie::r.'i.me.at

e.A.pl't:~::>~u

The

~ubjects

in the latter

mor·e confidence that they, themselves, would have

foreseen the actual outcome as the consequences, both negative and positive,
became more extreme (serious).

Thus, contrary to the original experiment

greater responsibility was not attributed to the stimulus person as the
outcomes became more extreme.
Shaver (1970a, 1970b) conducted five experiments using the last two
conditions of Walster's (1966) original study, possible versus actual injury
to other people.

SUbjects were instructed to make individual jury

decisions on the basis of pieces of evidence or testimony, presumably to be
used as baseline data for a jury study.

None of these studies round

significant differences in attribution of responsibility between minor and

I

serious accident conditions, although less responsibility was attributed

I when the

stimulus person carried insurance which compensated the injured

L-·~·---··~....-

--···. ---*·-..

----
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victim (Shaver, 1970b).

In these experiments Shaver made an attempt to

replicate Walster's (1966) findings, but his procedure was slightly
different.

Subjects were attributing responsibility as part of a jury study

and no attempt was made to prevent involvement with the victim. Walster's
results again were not replicated.

Shaver (1970a) hypothesized that these

failures at replication might be due to differences in perceived similarity

to the victim by the subjects.
As a matter of fact, Shaver (1970a) found that the more the perceived
similarity between the subject and the stimulus person, the less the responsibility assigned for the mishap.

In these experiments subjects perceived

the victim to be more similar in the severe consequences rather than in the
mild consequences condition, therefore, attributing less rasponsibility.

No

was led to theorize that the attribution process was more complex than
Wal.star had indicated. When the circumstances surrounding an accident or
the victim of an accident are sufficiently similar to the subject, defensive
attribution will take place. When the victim is seen as different by the
subject, he can easily be blamed for the accident.

However, when the victim

is seen as similar by the subject, the subject can no longer be assured that
his own behavior would not have similar consequences in that particular
situation.

The accident is seen as being externally caused thus making the

attribution of responsibility to the victim less correspondent.

The subject

is not seeking to avoid the consequences of the acci.dent as Walster had
theorized but rather is seeking to avoid blame for those consequences.
Since the subject cannot differentiate himself from the victim, the victim

a·
must not be responsible for the accident.

subjects in Experiment II (Shaver,

1970a) imagined either that they were very similar to the victim or that
they were very dissimilar from him.

Following the line of thinking of t.he

defensive attribution hypothesis, imaged-similar victims were rated as
significantly less responsible for an accident than imaged-different victims.
In the same line of research and following the suggestion made by Shaver

(1970a) that similarity between the perceiver and the victim of an accident
will lessen the attribution of responsibility to the victim for the
accident, McKillip (1972) controlled behavioral similarity and found that
subjects who smoked marijuana attributed lower responsibility for a serious
accident to a victim who himself snX>ked marijuana than to a victim whose
behavior was not similar.

McKillip's results were interpreted as supporting

the ueftm.s.i.vt:i a\,l:..dbu.ilion anal;yi:>i1:1 by Sh&.-ve:;; (1770a).

whein

att. :ributing

responsibility to a person who has a serious accident, the subject is
threatened by a high degree of similarity to this victim.

If the victim

were different, the subject could attribute high responsibility believing
that he, himself, would be more careful and thus would avoid the accident.
Since this self-defensiveness is not possible when the subject and the
victim are in fact similar, the subject tends to attribute the cause of the
accident to chance, thus lessening the attributed responsibility.

In a

later study by McKillip and Posavac (1972), a similarity by severity of
consequences interaction was found;

attribution of responsibility was

greater for the similar victim than for the d:i.ffarent victim in the m:iJ.d

I accident condition.

I

They interpreted the outcome saying that it may be that

in_:i:.:'.::_=nstanc::_~ •~ctim

of amild, but potentially harmful, J

9

accident is viewed as lucky.
Most studies of attribution of responsibility have used only one actor
who was both victim and perpetrator (Crinklaw & Vidmar, 1971;

1966).

Walster,

In those which employed two actors, only perceived similarity to

the perpetrator was measured (McKillip, 1972;

Shaver, 1970a).

In the

present experiment, subjects were asked to judge the responsibility of a
driver and of a pedestrian involved in an accident when the two were known
to be attitudinally similar or dissimilar to the judges.

In addition, the

severity of the accident was varied.
Hypotheses
The following hypotheses were suggested:
1.

less responsibility will be attributed to the similar

in the severe accident condition.

2.

Less responsibility will be attributed to the similar
driver than to the dissimilar driver, especially
in the severe accident condition.

3. If the above hypotheses are supported, compensation
given to the pedestrian should be greater when the
driver is dissitr.ilar and the pedestrian similar than
when the driver is similar and pedestrian dissimilar.
Compensation should be higher in the severe accident
compared to the mild accident condition.
The effects of sex of the subjects on

judgmen~s

of :responsibility

have not been explored, although sex differences have been reported {e.g.,

10

Walster, 1966). While no hypotheses concerning sex differences were
suggested, the design of the present study permitted an examination of some
dif'ferences between the judgments of fem.ales and males.

CHAPTER Il
MFTHOD

subjects
Subjects were 96 volunteers, 48 females and 48 males, who were enrolled
in sUI1111er school psychology classes at I..oyola University of Chicago.

were collected for 127 subjects in all;

Data

eight females and nine males did

not meet the quaJ.ifications mentioned below, and 14 protocols, nine females
and five males, were randomly dropped to equalize the number of subjects in
the treatments.

This was done, of course, before the dependent measures

were coded or analyzed.
Stimulus materials
F.ach subject was presented with a booklet divided into three sections.
The first

~onte.ined

a brief' int!'Oducticn t-o th.e

e~e!'i!?!ent :1

a. descr:!..pticn

of the accident, a selection of six attitudes attributed to the driver of
the accident, and six attitudes attributed to the pedestrian of the accident.
The second section consisted of nine questions regarding the accident in
which the subject was asked to indicate his or her judgment regarding the
degree to which the driver or victim was responsible for the accident.

The

last section of the booklet was a questionnaire containing 60 attitude items
which included the 12 selected for the similarity manipulations.
The cover sheet of the booklet informed the subjects that they were
·participating in a study of jury functioning, and that they would be given
part of an actual case report.

The subjects were asked to read the

information very carefully and report their judgments on the scales which
ll

12'

would follow.
Manipulation of accident severity.

The second page of the booklet

contained the manipulation of the severity of the accident.

In the severe

condition the following information was given to fe:male subjects:
Mary B. was driving her car on her way to college.

She was
not in a hurry, she was driving at a moderate speed. Traffic
at that time was light, the weather was clear, and visibility
was good. Suddenly Ann c., also a local college student,
stepped from between two parked cars and into the path of Mary's
car. Immediately Mary stepped on her brakes in an attempt to
avoid hitting Ann. However, Mary did not stop fast enough and
she hit Ann. Ann was taken to the hospital in an ambulance
where X-rays revealed that her right leg was broken. She was
also treated for cuts and bruises and remained in the hospital
for ten days.
For the mild accident condition, the second page of the booklet given
to fe:males was the following:
Mary B. was driving her car on her way to co.J..Lege. She was
not in a hurry, she was driving at a moderate speed. Traffic

at that time was light, the weather was clear, and visibility
was good. SUddenly Ann c., also a local college student,
stepped from between two parked cars and into the path of ~.ary's
car. Immediately Mary stepped on her brakes in an attempt to
avoid hitting Ann. However, ¥..ary did not stop fast enough and
she hit Ann. Ann was taken to the hospital in a police car
where X-rays revealed no bone damage. After Ann was treated
for bruises on her right leg, she went home under her own
power.
The mild and severe accident reports administered to mB.les were exactly
the same, except that the names of Mary and Ann were changed to Jack and
Paul, respectively.
Manipulation of similarity.

The third page of the test booklet

presented a rationale for giving the subjects information about the
·attitudes of the driver and attitudes of the pedestrian in the following

manner:

_ _ _ _J

13
In order to help you make a fair judgment of this case, it is
necessary for you to know something of the character of the
persons involved. It has been shown that a synopsis of
attitudes on a number of important topics helps subjects to
formulate more accurate impressions. On the following two
sheets of paper, then, are two sets of opinions held by
the driver or by the pedestrian. The i terns have been selected
to be r!?Presentative of the attitudes of each person, even
though they are only a small sample of each one's total
opinions. Guided by this knowledge, please answer the
questions about the driver and those about the pedestrian.

The fourth and fifth pages contained two sets of attitudes;

each set

had six pairs of attitude items of which one in each pair was indicated as
an attitude held either by the driver or by the pedestrian.

Presentation

of opinions held by the driver or by the pedestrian was counterbalanced.
The mode of presenting two sets of attitudes was taken from recent research
by McKillip and Posavac (1972);

each set contained responses which were

:trequently endorsed (high popularir,y) and responses wh:i.ch were .Less
frequently endorsed (low popularity attitudes).

The mean endorsement

frequencies for the subject population taken from the study by McKillip
and Posavac were .82 and .18, respectively.

By

manipulating the

endorsement. frequency of the attitudes, it was assured that most subjects
would be attitudinally similar to an actor attributed to hold high popular
attitude responses and different from an actor attributed to. hold low
popular responses.
Since any individual subject may hold unusual attitudes, it was
necessary to check on the adequacy of this way of manipulating similarity.
An attitude questionnaire containing 60 items (including the twelve items
used in the study) was given to the subjects in order to assess their own

Appendix C (where it is indicated which responses are popular and which
are

unpopular).

Seventeen subjects (8 females and 9 males) did not meet

the criterion of endorsing these items as expected and they were dropped
from the study.
The attitudes were presented in such a way that each set served
equally often as similar and d.issilnilar attitude items in all combi11ations.
The order of presentation was completely counterbalanced.

(See Appendix C

for a summary of the counterbalancing design.)
The dependent measures.

Pages six and seven of the experimental. booklet

contained the dependent measures and the manipulation checks.

The general.

format was to ask a question and have the subjects report their responses
on a twenty-one point bipolar scale labelled at both poles.

The first
The

judgment extended from "she (or he) was not at al.l responsible" to "she
(or he) was totally responsible. 11 The second question assessed attribution
of the driver's responsibility for the accident.

The judgment ranged from

"she (or he) was not at all responsible" to'she (or he) was totally
responsible." In question number three the size of compensation for the
victim was determined as an alternate way of assessing the judgment of
responsibility.
had been.

l.JU,estion number four asked how foreseeable the accident

The low pole was labelled "obviously foreseeable" and the high

pole "impossible to foresee." The remaining five judgments were
manipulation checks.

westion number five asked how similar the subject

felt she (or he) was to the pedestrian, and in question six it was asked
how similar the subject was to the driver.

The labels in both questions
zmw - ,. e

·•·n

=

J-.t

15.
were "she (or he) is totaJJ.y different," to "she (or he) is the same. 11 In
question seven it was asked how possible it was that the subject might be
in circumstances similar to the pedestrian in the accident reported.
~stion

number eight asked how possible it was that the subject might be in

circumstances similar to the driver in the accident reported.
was from nnever" to "easily."

The rating

The ninth question asked for ratings of how

severe they considered this incident to be.

The rating was from "very

severe" to 11inconsequential. 11
Attitude questionnaire.

The measure of subject's own attitudes was

presented in the booklet after the dependent variables were measured.
subjects were classified as similar to the high popular actor if they agreed
with the high popular answers on four or more of the stimulus items.
S'Ubjects were classifiea as dissinn.lar to

~ne

low popUJ.ar actor if they

disagreed with his responses on four of the six infrequent stimulus item
answers.

In other words, the criterion for acceptability as an experimental

subject was four or :roore responses on the survey of attitudes which were
the same as or different from the given attitudes of the appropriate
stimulus person.

The 6o items used in this survey of subject attitudes

are given in Appendix E.

In addition, the subjects were asked to identify

themselves in terms of sex and age.
Procedure
subjects were tested in groups, mostly of size twelve.

After they

were seated in the classroom used for the experiment, they were given one
·or the experimental booklets, which had been randomly ordered (except for
sex or driver and pedestrian) and were asked to complete the booklet
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carefully and honestly, after reading the general instructions.
were asked to read through the booklet at a comfortable pace.

The subjects
After all

subjects had finished, the experiment was fully explained to them.
Design

The basic design was a

2 X 2 X 2

factorial with degree of severity of

accident (mild or serious) , similarity to the driver, and similarity to the
pedestrian as factors.

Order of assignment to conditions was blocked

randomized in groups of eight.

Since there were six males and six females

in each treatment, sex was used as an additional factor in the analysis.
The nine dependent measures were subjected to 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 analysis of
variance.

CHAPTER III
RESULTS

Primary manipulation checks
An

ana1ysis of variance of the manipulation check of perceived

similarity to the Eedestrian (question five) revealed, as desired, that the
similar pedestrian was seen as more similar to the subject (X
the dissimilar pedestrian

(X = 4.35; E = 146.52,

elf

= 14.10)

= l/&>, E. (

than

.001).

There was also an interaction of sex by pedestrian for perceived similarity

to the pedestrian (E,

= 9.oo,

df'

= l/f30, E. < .01) • Table l contains the

means relevant to this interaction.

It can be seen that male subjects are

more extreme in their perceptions of similarity than female subjects.

The

analysis of variance al.so yielded a significant interaction of sex by
peci.e5i;,;d.an

by drive:i:· (f_

appropriate means.

= 4. 72,

df "" l/Go, lo!. ( .05).

Table:s 2 cont.aill5 tht:1

This interaction shows that the tendency for males to

report extreme perceived similarity to the pedestrian, as indicated in
Table l, occurred primarily when the driver was dissimilar.
The second manipulation check, question number six, dealt 'With
perceived similarity to the driver by the subjects.
are shown in Table 3.

The relevant means

The analysis of variance of this scale showed a

significant effect for the d:rlver's actual similarity (F

E.

< .001).

Similar drivers were seen as more similar to the subject

(X = 13.44) than diss.imilar drivers (X = 5.90).
manipulation was also effective.
by

= 59.02,.df = l/8o,

driver (£:

= 5.25,

df

Thus, this experimental

The significant interaction of pedestrian

= 1/00, E. < .05)
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indicates that subjects were 100re
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TABLE l
Mean Perceived Similarity to the Pedestrian
(Sex by Pedestrian Interaction)

Actual relationship between
subject and pedestrian attitudes
Similar

Dissimilar

Female

12.50

5.17

Male

15.71

3.54

Sex of

subject

Note. -- 24 subjects per cell.
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TABLE 2

Mean Perceived Similarity to the Pedestrian
(Sex by Pedestrian by Driver Interaction)

Actual relationship between
subject and pedestrian attitudes
Actual relationship
between subject and
driver attitudes
Similar

Dissimilar

Similar

8.83

D:i.ssiirilar

4e:JV

Female
'

f"'-.

Similar
MaJ.e

Dissimilar

16.83

2.33

Note. -- 12 subjects per cell.

"-------~----~-------------------------------------~----~--~~
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TABLE 3

Mean Perceived Similarity to the Driver
(Pedestrian by Driver Interaction)

Actual relationship between
subject and pedestrian attitudes
Actual. relationship
between subject and
driver attitudes

Similar

Similar

n.54

Dlssi m.ilar

Note. -- 24 subjects per cell.

Dissimilar
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extreme in perceptions of similarity to the driver when the pedestrian was
presented as dissimilar rather than similar to the subjects, especially
when the driver was presented as similar.
The third manipulation check concerned the perceived severity of the
accident.

The analysis or variance for this manipulation check yielded a

significant main effect for severity or accident (!:, •

E. ( .05).

The severe accident (X

the mild accident (X

= 11.81.)

5.56,

d.f'

= 1/80,

was seen as more serious than

= 9.50).

Secondary manipulation checks
Question number seven dealt with the possibility or the subject finding
himself (or herself) in similar circumstances· to those of the pedestrian.
The analysis of variance revealed a significant interaction of sex by
a.ccideut severity (!.,

= L..69,

elf

= 1/80,

2. < .or;). Table L. shows that

females were more likely to see themselves in the mild accident than were
males.

It had been expected that the judgment of being iri similar

circumstances as the pedestrian would have been influenced by the
manipulation of the pedestrian's similarity;

however, this effect did not

achieve significance.
Question number eight dealt with the possibility of the subject finding
himself (or herself) in circumstances similar to those of the driver.
)

The

analysis of variance showed that subjects similar to the driver saw themselves as 100re likely to be in such circumstances
dissimilar to the driver

(X

=

lJ. 75;

!'_

= 6.81,

elf

(X = 16.67) than subjects

= l/80, E. ( .05).

In general the manipulations seemed quite effective.

However, the

significant interactions among the independent var.tables found in the
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TABLE

4

Mean Perception of Being in Circumstances Similar to those
of the Pedestrian
(Sex by Accident Interaction)

Actual severity

or

the accident

Mild

Severe

Female

lJ.04

12.04

Male

8.67

12.63

of
subject
Sex:

Note. -- 24 subjects per cell.
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analyses or the manipulation checks are difficult to explain in terms of the
actual hypothesis tested.

Nevertheless, two general factors seem prominent.

First, f ema.les seemed to give less differentiated judgments than males regarding perceived similarity to the pedestrian, suggesting caution in
generalizing across sexes as urged by Thomas and Seeman (1972) • However,
the findings here seem to be contradictory, both to their findings that
males are universalistic and females are particularistic in judgments, and
to the results of Shaw, Floyd, and Gwin (1971) who found that females appear
to make greater differentiation aIOOng conditions than do men.

Second,

the contrast effect, in which subjects similar to one stimulus person increased their judgments of similarity to this person as dissimilarity to
the other stimulus person increased, ought to be kept in mind in similarity
manipulations involving two

sti.":l~US persor.s~

Dependent measures
The analysis of variance of attribution or responsibility to the

pedestrian showed a significant ma.in effect for accident severity (E.,

!!!. = 1/80,

~

(

= 5.05,

.o5). subjects judged the pedestrian as :roore responsible

for the mild accident

(X = 17.10) than for the severe accident (X = 15.17).

The analysis of variance also yielded a significant accident by driver
interaction of ([

= 5.27, 2f. = 1/80,

~

(

.05).

Table

5 indicates

that the

pedestrian was judged least responsible in the severe accident-dissimilar
driver condition and most responsible in the mild accident-dissimilar
driver condition.
The driver by pedestrian interaction was also significant ([
df

= 1/80,

~

( .05).

Table 6 contains these means.

= 6.69,

In the mild accident,
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TABLE

5

Mean Attribution ot Responsibility to the Pedestrian
(Accident by Driver Interaction)

Relationship between subject
and driver attitudes
Dissimilar

Similar
Mild

16.50

Severe

16.54

Accident

13.79

I
N::>te. --

24 subjects per cell.

TABLE

Mean Attribution

or

6

Responsibility to the Pedestrian

(Accident by Pedestrian by Driver Interaction)

Relationship between subject
and pedestrian attitudes
Relationship between
subject and driver
attitudes by accident
severity
Similar

Dissimilar

17.42

15.56

.L

.. 7·:>:>
""" . . .

18.08

Similar

15.33

17.75

Dissimilar

15.75

n.63

Similar
Mild

I

Severe

Note. -- 12 subjects per cell.
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dissimilar pedestrian and dissimilar driver condition, subjects attributed
the ioost responsibility to the pedestrian.

However, they attributed least

responsibility when the subjects found themselves dissimilar to the
pedestrian and to the driver and were judging the severe accident.
Anal.ysis of the attribution of responsibility to the driver revealed a
significant interaction of sex by accident severity (E,

E.

<.05).

Table 7 contains the

means

= 5.54,

df

showing this interaction.

= 1/80,

This

interaction showed that female subjects attributed ioore responsibility to
the driver in the mild accident than in the severe accident, while male
subjects attributed less responsibility to the driver for the mild accident
than for the severe accident.

Comparing Tables 6 and 7, it can be seen that
.

~··

overall subjects attributed far ioore responsibility to the i>"~destrian

(i = 16.14) than

to the driver

(X = 5. 78). This

r~lo.ti.<.n.ll:litl.!' will

ht;

important in the discussion of ing;>rovements on the present design.
The third dependent variable, compensation which the pedestrian should
be given by the driver's insurance company, yielded a significant main

effect for accident severity (E, = 4.50, df = 1/80, E.<

.05).

The subjects

were 'Willing to award more compensation in the severe accident
than in the mild accident

(X = 8.92)

(X = 6.79).

With respect to the foreseeability of the accident, females indicated
the accident to be roore foreseeable

!,

= 4.61,

df

= 1/80, E.

<.05).

(X = 16.75) than male subjects (X = 14.62;

There was also a significant interaction

of accident severity by pedestrian by drivar {E

= 5. 36,

df

= 1/80, E. ( •05) •

·The means related to this three-way interaction are in Table 8.

It is hard

to speculate on reasons for this particular pattern since on reflection it
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TABLE

7

Mean Attribution of Responsibility to the Driver
(Sex by Driver Interaction)

Severity or the accident
Mild

Severe

Female

6.75

5.21

Male

4.13

7.04

Sex of
subject

Note. -- 24 subjects per cell.
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TABLE 8
Mean Perceived Foreseeability of Accident
(Accident by Pedestrian by Driver Interaction)

Relationship between subject
and pedestrian attitudes
Relationship between
subject and driver
attitudes by
accident severity
Silnilar
Similar

Dissimilar

18.17

Mild

.

i2~67
-· ...

l~-~8
.

Similar

15.42

17.17

Dissimilar

16.42

15.50

- - - - · -

4-

Severe
-

Note. -- 12 subjects per cell.
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is not clear whether subjects were estimating foreseeability for pedestrians
or for drivers.
To analyze the role of sex differences in regard to the dependent
measures, scores for the dependent measures were intercorrelated, across
levels of accident severity and of similarity, separately for female and
The correlations are presented in Table 9.

male subjects.

In general, it

may be stated that the directionality of the correlations was consistently
identical for the sexes though attained levels of significance were not
always comparable.

Specifically, attribution of responsibility to the

pedestrian and to the driver correlated significantly for both females
(£

= -.54, !!!. = 46, l?.

< .001)

!!!. = 46,

and for males (£ = -.54,

l?.

< .001),

as did the correlation between attribution of responsibility to the
pedestrian and size of compensation, females (£ = -.32,
and males (£ =

-.53,

df

!!!. = 46,

l?.

< .Ol)

= 46, l?. '( .001). The positive correlation between

attribution of responsibility to the driver and foreseeability of the accident
was significant only for females (£ = .30,

~

= 46, l?.

<: .001).

The positive

correlation between attribution of responsibility to the driver was
significant for both females (£ = .53,
s!!_

= 46, E.

<.001).

!!!. = 46,

l?.

< .001)

and males (£ = .51,

The negative correlation between attribution of

responsibility and foreseeability of the accident was significant only for
males (£

=

-.42,

d.t

= 46, l?. <:., .001). When separate correlations were per-

.formed for both conditions of the accident, the directionality of the
correlations was the same as that for overall accident comparisons. In
general, these correlation results do not suggest that differences between
rating of males and females in the various conditions were due to'differences

TABLE 9
Correlations of Dependent Measures f.)r Females and Males for
Accident Conditions

I Ia
I

a

Females
Males

I~

Females
Males

IIIa

-.54***
-.54***

II Ia

a

IV

-.32**

.30*

-.52***

.18

.53***
.51***

-.14
--42***

Females

-.14

Males

-.20

t1 Represents attribution of responsibility to the Pedestrian.
IIa Represents attribution of responsibility to the Driver.
IIIa Represents size ot compensation to the Pedestrian.
IVa Represents foreseeability of the Accident.

\,,.).

0

*l? <: .05

~ "<::

-a ,

.01

.OOJ.

I
-

··-
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in interpretation or scales.

CHAPrER IV
DISCUSSION
The first hypothesis suggested for the present study was that less
responsibility would be attributed to the similar pedestrian than to the
dissimilar pedestrian, especially in the severe accident condition.

The

significant driver by accident interaction indicates that the pedestrian
was judged least responsible in the severe accident-dissimilar driver
condition.

The significant accident by pedestrian by driver interaction

seemed to be caused primarily by the low responsibility attributed to the
pedestrian when the dissilTlilar pedestrian and dissimilar driver were
involved in the mild accident coupled with the high responsibility
attributed to the pedestrian when the dissimilar pedestrian and dissimilar
driver were involved in the severe accidehC..

Ther-e lti 11.:1 clear-cn"-t pa.tterr,

to these results which allows meaningful generalizations.

~thesis

I was

not supported.
The second hypothesis postulated less reaponsi\)ility attr!lbuted to the
similar driver than·to the dissimilar driver, especially in the severe
accident condition.

The data relevant to this hypothesis show that the male

subjects attributed less responsibility to the driver in the mild accident
than in the severe accident condition.

However, female subjects attributed

DrJre responsibility to the driver in the mild accident than in the severe
accident condition.

However, these differences were unrelated to

·effects offers no support for the second hypothesi •
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opposite tendency, attributing mre responsibility to the driver in the
severe than in the mild accident conditions. 'While the data were in the
process of being analyzed, the results of Deau:x: 1 s (1972) research were
brought to the attention or the writer.

Her results indicate that the

pennutations of sex of judge and sex of stimulus person do not lead to
equivalent results.

Inasmuch as males were judging males and females

judging femaJ.es in the present experiment, it is unclear whether the results
in this experiment were due to the judge's sex or the sex of the sti.nnilus
persons.

Nevertheless, Thomas and Seaman's (1972) finding that males were

mre universalistic and females ioore particularistic in judgments does not
seem to be applicable to judgments regarding attribution of responsibility.
over all levels of similarity to the pedestrian and driver, both sexes
w.:S.L"t.t

h.1.ghly oompai•able ir1 their judgiuants.

Directions for improvements in design include:

(a) rewriting the

story, (b) including heterosexual stimulus person-subject pairs, (c) control
for age of subjects, and (d) ioore clear dependent variable wording.
The story should be written in a different fashion, to give the
opportunity to subjects to identify themselves according to their own
perceptions of the external world (environment) as Kelley proposed.

A

better story would leave the question of responsibility ioore ambiguous.
Mary B. was driving her car on her wrq to college. She
was in a hurry, trying to get to class on time; she was
driving at a moderate speed. Traffic at that time was
light, and it was raining. Unexpectedly, as Mary was
just two blocks away from campus, she recalled seeing a
person (who turned out to be Ann c.) in front of her car.
Immediately Mary stepped on her brakes in an attempt to
atop her car. However, Mary did not stop fast enough
and hit Ann.
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Another alternative for changing the reports that may be helpful is to
present subjects two different stories of the accident, one story as told
by

the driver and the second as told by the pedestrian. This will permit

the study of another possible source of bias in judging and
responsibility to the parties involved.

~ttributing

It may also allow the subjects'

perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, and opinions more strongly to inflmnce
the judgments.
On a more general methodological. level, the present study suggests
that results based on male-only and female-only samples are not equivalent.
Therefore, in order to improve generalizability, (a) subject males should
judge males, (b) subject males should judge females, (c) subject females
should judge fema:Les, and (d) subject females should judge males, in order
to clarify sex distinctions.

The age variable of the subjects should be consistent with the age of
the stimUlus person.
ranged from 18 to

47,

In the present study, the female subjects' ages
and the ma.le subjects' ages ranged from 18 to

45.

The subjects who participated in the present study were all summer school
students. Such age differences could easily have obscured the manipulations
of attitude similarity.
Finally, the meaning of the foreseeability dependent variable was
1lllclear, and should be rewritten into two qmstions.

One would deal with

the possibility of the driver foreseeing the accident and the other with
the possibility of the pedestrian foreseeing it.

APPENDIX A
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

37·

DEPARTMEm' OF PSYCHOIDGY
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY

Maey people are cal.led upon to make decisions
concerning how responsible another person is for his
behavior or for the results of his behavior. The
processes people employ to make such decisions are not
clearly understood because most outcomes are partially
caused by the people involved and partially caused by
the unforeseen situation. Some situations are easily
foreseeable while others, of course, are very unlikely
to be foreseen. Whether you are a committee chairman,
a jury member, a roommate, a teacher, a supervisor, a
parent, a judge, a consumer, etc., there are many
situations which require you to make informal decisions
concerning the degree of a person's responsibility for
some behavior or outcome. However, the level of
respo!'..sibility ror various outcomes mllSt ba liete1111iooci
before further research into the process of making
responsibility judgments can be conducted.
Please read the following case report carefully
Inasmuch as
attribution of responsibility to other people for their
behaviors and outcomes is an important type of judgment
for many kinds of human interactions, your work is a
necessary preliminary to further research. Thus, a
careful consideration of the judgments you report would
be sincerely appreciated.
and report the judgments requested.

· Thank you for your cooperation.

APPENDIX B
STORY

i - Severe Accident, femaJ.es
i i - Mild Accident, .ferr.ia.les

iii - Severe Accident, males

iv - Mild Accident, males
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Severe Accident
Mary B. was driving her car on her way to college.

She was not in a hur?"7, she was driving at a mderate
speed.

Traffic at that time was light, the weather was

clear, and visibility was good.

SUddenly Ann C., also a

local college student, stepped between two parked cars
and into the path of Mary's car.

Immediately Mary

stepped on her brakes in an attempt to avoid hitting Ann.
lbwever, Mary did not stop fast enough and she hit Ann.
Ann was taken to the hospital in an ambulance where

X-rays revealed that her right leg was broken.

She was

also treated for cuts and bruises and remained in the
hospital for ten days.
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Mild Accident
Mary B. was driving her car on her way to col+ege.

She was n:>t in a hurry, she was driving at a iooderate
speed.

Traffic at that time was light, the weather was

clear, and visibility was good.

suddenly Ann

c.,

also

a local college student, stepped from between two parked
cars and into the path of Mary's car.

Immediately Mary

stepped on her brakes in an attempt to avoid hitting Ann.
However, Mary did not stop fast enough and she ltl.t Ann.
Ann

was taken to the hospital in a police car

wh re X-rays r9vealed no bone darn.age.
0

.ti'ter .A!'..n was

treated for bruises on her right leg, she went home
under her own power.

Severe Accident
Jack B. was driving his car on his way to

col~ege.

He was not in a hurry, he was driving at a mderate speed.

Traffic at that time was light, the weather was clear,
and visibility was good.

SUddenly Paul C., also a

local college student, stepped from between two parked
cars and into the path of Jack's car.

Immediately

Jack stepped on his brakes in an attempt to avoid
hitting Paul.

However, Jack did :oot. stop fast enough

and he hit Paul.
P.li:ttl was t.a.ken to t.he hoapit..al in an ambulance

where X-rays revealed that his right leg was broken.

He was also treated for cuts and bruises and remained
in the hospital for ten days.

Mild Accident
Jack B. was driving his car on his way to college.
He was not in a hurry, he was driving at a moderate speed.
Traffic at that time was light, the weather was clear,
and visibility was good.

Suddenly PauJ.

c.,

also a

local. college student, stepped from between two parked
cars and into the path of Jack's car.

Immediately

Jack stepped on his brakes in an attempt to avoid
hitting Paul.

However, Jack did not stop fast enough

and he hit Paul.

Paul was

~l~cn

tc the !"..ocpitel in a police car

where X-rays revealed no bone damage.

After Paul was

treated for bruises on his right leg, he went home
under his own power.

APPENDIX C
i - Presentation Design
i i - Instructions

i i i - Attitudes - Set "A"

iv - Attitudes - Set 11 B11

The attitudes were presented in such a way that
the driver and the pedestrian were represented equall.y
often by the two sets of attitudes.

The order of

presentation was completely counterbalanced.

Thus, we

had the following sets:
I

II

III

IV

Similar Driver

S:im:ilar Pedestrian

A - High Popular
endorsements

B - High Popular
endorsements

B - High Popular
endorsements

A - High Popular
endorsements

Similar Driver

DissintiJ.ar Pedestrian

A - High Popular

B - Low Popular

sndorse."l".ent:::

endorze~nt::

B - !Dw Popular
endorsements

A - High Popular
endorsements

Di.ss:im:ilar Driver

Similar Pedestrian

A - !Dw Popular
endorsements

B - High Popular
endorsements

B - Low Popular
endorsements

A - High Popular
endorsements

Dissimilar Driver

Diss:im:ilar Pedestrian

A - Low Popular
endorsements

B - !Dw Popular
endorsements

B - Low Popular
endorsements

A - Low Popular
endorsements
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In order to help you make a f'air judgment of
this case, it is necessary for you to know something
of the character of the persons involved. It has been
shown that a synopsis of attitudes on a number of
important topics helps subjects to formulate more
accurate impressions.
On the following two sheets of paper, then, are two
sets of opinions held by the driver or by the pedestrian.
The items have been selected to be representative or the
attitu.ties of each ::?'=':':'Son.., even thol'eh t,h~y P-J:'"" only ~:::.-r..fil ~~"i;>le of each one 1 ~ total cpinic!'..s.
Guided by this knowledge, please answer the
questions about the driver and those about the
predestrian.
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Attitudes - Set "A"
(High endorsement responses circled)

1.

2.

©
B.

I am against freshmen being allowed to have
cars on campus.

A.

I f'eel that people should usually go along with
group opinion even if' they disagree with it.

@
3.

I am in .favor of .freshmen being allowed to
have cars on campus.
·

@

I f'eel that people should usually ignore group
opinion i.f they disagree with it.
I am in favor of st.udent social activism.

.B. I am against student social activism•

4. A.

~
5.

G

In gcncr~, I a,171 cg.::.inst nccldr..g nr..d pcttir.g
among couples in college.

In general, I am in favor of necking and petting
among couples in college.
I believe that the .father should discipline
the children in the .fam.ily.

B. I believe that the mother should discipline
the children in the family.

6. A. I believe that fresh air and daily exercise are
mt important.

G) important.
I believe that .fresh air

and daily exercise are
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Attitudes - Set "B11
(High endoresment responses circled)
1.

@ I enjoy sports.
B. I dislike sports.

2.

A.

I believe that girls should be allowed to date
before they are in high school.

G.;) date
I believe that girls should not be allowed to
until they are in high school.
3.

4.

0

I believe that rooney is not one or the ioost
goals in life.

~important
B.

I believe that money is one of the m:>st
in¥ortant goals in life.

A.

In general, I am against an emphasis on the
social aspects of college life.
In general, I am in favor of an emphasis on
the social aspects of college life.
I enjoy doing creative work.

B.

6. A.

®

I dislike doing creative work.
I am in favor of the draft.
I am opposed to the draft.

APPENDIX D
SCALE
i - Manipulation Checks for females and males
i i - Dependent Measures for f ema.les and males
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Please circle the number on the scale which best
represents your judgment on the information you
have just been given.
l.

D:> you feel that Ann c. (the pedestrian) was
responsible for the accident in which she was hurt?

l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21
She was not at
all responsible

2.

She was totally
responsible

D:> you feel that Mary B. (the driver) was responsible
for the accident in which Ann c. was hurt?

1--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14·-15--16--11--18--19--20--21
She was not at
all responsible

She was totally
responsible

3. Relatively speaking, what size of compensation
should be given to the pedestrian, Ann, by Mary's
insurance company?

l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21
· Very large

Very small

4.

How foreseeable was this incident?

l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21
J.mpossible
to foresee

Obviously
foreseeable

5.

How similar do you think the pedestrian, Ann
is to you?

c.,

.l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--lh--15--16--17--18--19--20--21
She is totally
different

She is the
same

6.

How similar do you think the driver; Mary

B.,

is to you?

l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21
She is the
same

She is totally
different

7. How possible do you think it is that you might
be in circumstances similar to those of the
pedestrian, Ann?

l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21
Easily

Never

8. How possible do you think it is that you might
be in circumstances similar to those of the driver,
Mar-.r B.?

l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21
Easily

Never

9.

How severe do you consider this incident to 1;3?

l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21
Very severe

Inconsequential

Please circle the n1.lil1ber on the scale which best
represents your judgment on the information you
have just been given.
l.

lb you feel that Paul c. (the pedestrian) was
responsible for the accident in which he was hurt?

l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21
He was not at

He was tot~
responsible

all responsible

2.

D::> you feel that Jack B. (the driver) was responsible for the accident in which Paul c. was hurt?

l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21
He was totally
responsible

He was not at
all responsible

3. Relatively speaking, what size of compensation
should be given to the pedestrian, Paul, by
Jack's insurance company?

l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21
Ver-y large

Very smaJ.l

4. How foreseeable was this incident?
l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21
Impossible
to foresee

Obviously
foreseeable

5. How similar
is to you?

do you think the pedestrian, Paul

c.,

l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21
He is totally
different

He is the
same

52.

6. How similar do you think· the driver, Jack B. ,
is to you?

l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21
He is

totally

He is the

different

same

7. How possible do you think it is that you might
be in circumstances similar to those of the
pedestrian, Paul?

l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21
Never

l!asily

8.

How possible do you think it is that you might
oir::~-:r~t.~ccs ;:;it"ri.il~ to tho~c of th~ dz!var J

bo in
Jack

n.?

l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21
Never

l!asily

9. How severe do you consider this incident to

be?

l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21
Very severe

Inconsequential

APPENDIX E
i - Instructions
i i - Su...""V'ey cf

At.titud~!:!
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The next part of the experiment is an attempt to
get at opinions which you yourself hold, which might have

influenced your ratings in the first part of the
experiment. Your answer sheet is anonymous and there
is no way that your answers could be traced to you.
However, because of the importance of this aspect of
the study, your frank and careful answers to the

questions are illlpor-eant.
After the completion of this part of the experiment,
any- question which you have will be answered.

Remember, the success of this research depends on
the care with which you answer these questions.

SURVEY OF ATTITUDES

Age:

Sex:

Class:

Fr.

-

Soph.

-

Jr.

-

Sr.

-

Please indicate yaur attitude toward each of the topics below. Mark on
your answer sheet· either "A 11 or 11B11 whichever is the more accurate
description of your attitude on the subject.
l.

2.

A.

I am against fraternities and sororities as they usually function.

B.

I am in favor of fraternities and sororities as they usually fmiction.

A.

I enjoy western ioovies and television programs.

B.

I dislike western ioovies and television programs.

3. A.
B.

4.

'·

In general., I am in favor of undergraduates getting married.
In general., I am against undergraduates getting married.

A. I dislike situation comedies.
B.

I enj()y· ai·tualiion co11i6tlies.

A.

I believe that there is a God.

B. I believe that there is no God.

6. A.
B.

I feel that university professors are indifferent to student needs.
I feel that university professors are concerned atout student. needs.

7. A. In general., I am against necking and petting among couples

in

college.

B. In general, I am in favor of necking

and petting aroong couples in

college.

8. A. In general, I am in favor of siooking.
B.

In general, I am against SIOOlci.ng.

9. A. Racial integration in public schools is a mistake, and I am against
it.

B. Racial integration in public schools is a good plan, and I am in
favor of it.

56
10. A.

B.
ll.

I enjoy comedians who use satire.
I dislike comedians who use satire.

A. I feel that it is better if people usually act on impulse.
B.

12. A.

B.

I feel that it is better if people usually engage in a careful
consideration of alternatives. ·
In general, I am against an emphasis on the social aspects of
college life.
In general, I am in favor of an emphasis on the social aspects of

college life.

13. A.

B.

I am in favor of most birth control techniques.
I am opposed to m::>st birth control techniques.

J.4. A. I dislike classical nrusic.

i;:;..

B.

I enjoy classical music.

A.

In ga:;.1e::ra.l, ::: a.ill in favor vf ccl:!..Ggc stud.sJ::..ts drinid.ng alcoholic
beve.:t'ages.

B.

In general, I am opposed to college students drinld.ng alcoholic
beverages.

16. A.
B.
17. A.
B.
18. A.
B.
19. A.
B.
20. A.
B.

I believe that the American way of life is not the best.
I believe that the American way of life is the

best~

I enjoy sports.
I dislike sports.
In general, I am opposed to premarital sex relations.
In general, I am in favor of premarital sex relations.

I enjoy science fiction.
I dislike science fiction.
I believe that m::>ney is not one of the m::>st important goals in life.
I believe that money is one of the 100st inq)ortant goals in life.
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21.

22.

A. I am in favor of the university grading system as it now exists.
B.

I am opposed to the university grading system as it now exists.

A.

I prefer the Deroocratic party.

B. I prefer the Republican party.
23.

A.

I feel that people should usually ignore group opinion i f they
disagree with it.

B. I feel that people should usually go along with group opinion even
i f they disagree with it.

24. A.

I believe that my church represents the one true religion.

B. I believe that no church represents the one true religion.
25. A.
B.

I dislike musical comedies.
I enjoy musical comedies.

26. A. I believe that preparedness for war will not tend to precipitate
war.

B. I believe that preparedness for war will tend to precipitate war.
27. A.

B.

I am opposed to increased welfare legislation.
I am in favor of increased welfare legislation.

28. A. I enjoy doing creative work.
B.
29. A.

I dislike doing creative work.
I believe that girls should be allowed to date before they are in
high school.

B. I believe that girls should not be allowed to date until they are
in high school.

30. A.

B.
31. A.

B.

I believe that Red China should not be admitted to the U.N.
I believe that Red China should be admitted to the U.N.
I dislike reading novels.
I enjoy reading novels.

5.8
32.

A.

I am opposed to socialized medicine as it operates in Great
Britain.

B.

I am in favor or socialized medicine as it operates in Great
Britain.

33. A. I feel that war is sometimes necessary to solve world problems.
B. I feel that war is never necessary to solve world problems.

34.

A.

I am opposed to a state income tax.

B. I am in favor of a state income tax.
35. A. I am opposed to the custom of tipping.
B. I am in favor of the custom of tipping.
36. A. I enjoy keeping pets.
B. I dislike keeping pets.
37. A. I enjoy foreign m::>vies.
V•

I dislike foreign movies:

A.

I am against strict disciplining of children.

B.

I am in favor of strict disciplining of children.

A.

I believe that parents should provide financial help to young
married couples.

B.

I believe that parents should not provide financial help to young
married couples.

A.

I am in favor of freshmen being allowed to have cars on campus.

B.

I am against freshmen being allowed to have cars on campus.

T)

38.

39.

40.

41. A. I am
B.

in favor of requiring students to learn a foreign language.

I am opposed to requiring students to learn a foreign language.

42. A. I believe it is very important for a person

to have a college

education in order to be successful.
B.

I believe that it is not very important for a person to have a
college education in order to be successful.
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43.

A.

I believe that fresh air and daily exercise are not important.

B. I believe that fresh air and daily exercise are important.·

44. A. I believe that the father should discipline the children in the
family.

B. I believe that the mother should discipline the children in the
family.

45.
46.

47.

A.

I am opposed to the federal govermnent's buildup of nuclear arms.

B.

I am in favor of the federal government's buildup of nuclear arms.

A.

I believe that the federal government should provide community
bomb shelters.

B.

I believe that individuals should provide their own bomb shelters.

A.

I am opposed to divorce.

B. I am in favor of divorce.

48.

A.

I enjoy gardening.

B. I dislike gardening.

49.

A.

I enjoy dancing.

B. I dislike dancing.

5o.
51.

A.

I am in favor of the draft.

B.

I am opposed to the draft.

A.

I believe that women are not taldng too aggressive a role in
society today.

B. I believe that women are taldng too aggressive a role in society
today.

52.

A.

I believe that the man in the family should handle the finances.

B. I believe that the woman in the family should handle the finances.

53.

A.

I dislike looking at exhibitions of modern art.

B. I enjoy looking at exhibitions of modern art.

6o

54. A. I

55.
56.
57.
58.

am in favor of women pursuing careers.

B.

I am opposed to women pursuing careers.

A.

I believe that men adjust to stress better than women.

B.

I believe that men do not adjust to stress better than women.

A.

I feel that Loyola is not too preprofessionally oriented.

B.

I feel that Loyola is too preprofessionally oriented.

A.

I believe that Chicago is not a progressive city.

B.

I believe that Chicago is a progressive city.

A.

I believe that a Congressmen should follow his own convictions when
they conflict with those of the majority of his constituents.

B.

I believe that a Congressman should not follow his own convictions
when they conflict with those of the majority of his constituents.

59. A. I prefer that none of

60.

my required courses be on a pass-fail basis.

B.

I prerer that some or my required courses be on a pass-fail basis.

A.

I am in favor of student social activism.

B.

I am against student social activismo
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